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In the eight years that have elapsed since title I of the Texas Family Code'
became effective, most of the questions of spousal status posed by the Code
have been tentatively resolved. 2 Developments elsewhere, however, may
rekindle a past dispute. In August 1977 the Vatican enunciated the policy
that a male incapable of procreation because of undergoing vasectomy
surgery might still enter into an ecclesiastically valid marriage. This policy
tends to undermine the contention that procreation is one of the principal
objectives of the marital union. That argument has also been advanced as a
policy bar to allowing "marriage" between persons of the same sex.3 At the
same time, state constitutional law against sex discrimination continues to
be urged4 as a ground for nullifying prohibitions against unisexual unions
akin to marriage since such prohibitions may deprive such persons of the
benefits the law confers on married couples.' While the validity of such
unisexual unions were not discussed by Texas appellate judges in the past
year, other issues concerning spousal status were decisively dealt with.
Wife's Name. A Houston court of civil appeals 6 dealt with the appropriate
name to be used by a married woman. A wife sought judicial approval to use
her maiden surname during marriage. 7 Reversing the trial court's denial of
her petition, the court of appeals concluded that an application for change of
* B.A., The University of Texas; B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia
University; Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Southern Methodist University.
1. 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 888 (effective Jan. 1, 1970).
2. For a brief popular treatment of the status of married women in Texas see S. WEDDING-
TON, THE LEGAL STATUS OF HOMEMAKERS IN TEXAS (1977). In spite of some historical inac-
curacies (id. at 4, particularly) the work is generally accurate and informative for the lay
audience for which it was prepared. One wonders, however, why the author chose to rely (id. at
13, n.32) on Nebraska authority for the duty of spousal support rather than upon TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 4.02 (1975) or even upon Gonzales v. Gonzales, 117 Tex. 183, 300 S.W. 20 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1927, opinion adopted). See also Hughes, Status of Women in Texas, in 3
HANDBOOK OF TEXAS 1125 (1976), which presents a historical and reflective treatment of the
subject.
3. See Kurtz, The State Equal Rights Amendments and Their Impact on Domestic Rela-
tions Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 101, 120 (1977). Nonetheless, marriage of an elderly person incapable
of procreation is generally sanctioned everywhere.
4. Id. at 115-23. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3(a).
5. E.g., the right to claim a rural family homestead of 200 acres as opposed to one of
merely 100 acres allowed to a single adult. Note prior TEX. Arr'y GEN. Op. Nos. M-1277, M-
1216 (1972) and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.01, .91(a) (Vernon 1975). McKnight, Commentary
to the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 281, 282 (1974).
6. 547 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ).
7. In TEX. Arr'y. GEN. Op. No. H-432 (1974) the attorney general stated that at marriage a
woman may choose to take her husband's name or continue to use her existing name. See
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 68-69 (1975).
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name should be granted unless sought for a wrongful or capricious purpose.
The court noted that section 32.21 of the Family Code does not require that
the other spouse be made a party to the proceeding.8 Because the wife's
motives were legitimate9 and because she believed use of her maiden name
would be in her interest, the court held that to deny her the use of that name
would be contrary to the principle of equal protection of the law. Even
without judicial authorization, however, a married woman may, if she
wishes,10 deal with third persons in a name other than that of her husband,"
especially when she does not purport to act as his agent. While it is conven-
tional for a former wife, particularly one who has custody of any children of
the marriage, to use the former husband's surname, a court may allow an ex-
husband of a childless marriage to restrain the ex-wife's use of his surname,
especially if the divorce was not grounded on his fault. 12
Interspousal Torts. The Texas Supreme Court abolished the interspousal
tort immunity doctrine as applied to intentional torts in Bounds v. Caudle. 13
That doctrine had been enunciated in Nickerson & Matson v. Nickerson 14
and was reiterated by the same court as recently as 1964.15 In Bounds the
children brought suit against their stepfather for the wrongful death of their
mother. Under the interspousal immunity doctrine the children could not
have recovered if the doctrine would have precluded their mother from
recovering for a willful tort had she survived. The supreme court held that
the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action since statutory changes in Texas
law have given each spouse sole management of recoveries for personal
injury 6 and, as a practical matter, family harmony is not disrupted by such
suits. The doctrine had, therefore, lost its validity for the purpose of recov-
ery for intentional torts.' 7
Divorce Procedure. Satisfaction of domiciliary requirements, normally on
the part of the petitioner, is an aspect of the jurisdictional power of the
divorce court. Nevertheless, the residence requirement prescribed by sec-
8. 547 S.W.2d at 359.
9. Id. at 359-60.
10. Any person may use the name of his choice except for the purpose of misleading or
harming others.
I I. The board of directors of the State Bar of Texas has recommended that a provision be
added to the Rules Governing the State Bar of Texas, art. XII, § 8, Disciplinary Rule 2-102(B),
that there is no prohibition to a married woman's practicing law "under her maiden name."
12. See also Welcker v. Welcker, 342 So. 2d 251 (La. Ct. App. 1977). The court denied ex-
husband's petition to restrain his ex-wife of a childless marriage from using his surname on
grounds of "established custom and equity."
13. 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977). The holding applies only to cases in which a tort was
committed on or after March 1, 1971. For a general discussion of the case see Reynolds,
Changing Times: A look at the interspousal tort immunity doctrine in Texas after Bounds v.
Caudle, 41 TEX. B.J. 153 (1978).
14. 65 Tex. 281 (1886).
15. Turner v. Turner, 385 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1964).
16. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.04, 5.01(a)(3) (Vernon 1975).
17. Without characterizing the policy as either separate or community property, the court
in Bounds held that the convicted killer-beneficiary lost the proceeds of an insurance policy on
the life of the victim through imposition of a constructive trust in favor of the insured's nearest
relatives. See also TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 41(d) (Vernon 1956); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art.
21.23 (Vernon 1963).
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tion 3.21 of the Family Code is not jurisdictional but is merely a prerequisite
to suit which the respondent must assert. Disputed with respect to personal
jurisdiction over the respondent, however, often focus on deprivation of
personal and property rights of the respondent rather than on the court's
power to dissolve the marriage. 8 If the court purports to sever the cause of
action for divorce from the division of property and matters affecting the
custody and support of children because the respondent cannot be found,
the respondent cannot perfect an appeal since the judgment of divorce is
interlocutory.' 9 The issues of divorce on the one hand and division of
property and provision for the children on the other cannot be severed. 20
Interlocutory orders may not survive entry of a judgment for divorce. 21
Although some doubts have been entertained in this regard, 22 the trial court
may order spouse-support pending appeal. 23 With proper supportive plead-
ings the court may grant attorney's fees for appeal as well. 24
A number of appeals were taken from default judgments for divorce. One
reversal25 was based on the requirements of rules 107 and 23926 that a return
of citation must be on file ten days before a default judgment is taken.
Another reversal27 was based on an award of attorney's fees sought by way
of a trial amendment made without notice. A respondent's right to a record
of the divorce proceedings was in issue in two appeals from default judg-
ments. In Shepard v. Shepard28 the court indicated that the 1975 amendment
to article 232429, making a reporter available "upon request," in effect
absolves the appellee of the need to provide any kind of factual record for
purposes of appeal. 30 In Rogers v. Rogers,31 however, the Supreme Court of
18. See Scott v. Scott, 554 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1977, no writ);
Layton v. Layton, 538 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ), discussed in
Note, Full Faith and Credit Versus State Interest: The Last-in-Time Rule in Texas, 55 TEXAS L.
REV. 127 (1976). See also notes 109-16 infra and accompanying text.
19. Campbell v. Campbell, 550 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
20. See, e.g., Garrison v. Texas Commerce Bank, 560 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ), a sequal to Garrison v. Mead, 553 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1977, no writ); Austin v. Austin, 553 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1977, writ dism'd); Adam v. Stewart, 552 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1977, no writ); Campbell v. Campbell, 550 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no
writ); Reed v. Williams, 545 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
21. See, e.g., Beavers v. Beavers, 545 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
See McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 413, 465
(1976).
22. See Ex parte Hodges, 130 Tex. 280, 109 S.W.2d 964 (1937).
23. See, e.g., Ex parte Kollenborn, 153 Tex. 350,269 S.W.2d 339 (1954); Exparte Lohmul-
ler, 103 Tex. 474, 129 S.W. 834 (1910); Trevino v. Trevino, 555 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1977, no writ); Clay v. Clay, 550 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1977, no writ); cf. McCartney v. McCartney, 548 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[ist Dist.] 1976, no writ) (alleging abuse of discretion for failure to so award).
24. Dickson v. McWilliams, 543 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1976, no
writ); Carson v. Carson, 528 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
25. Gentry v. Gentry, 550 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
26. TEX. R. Cv. P. 107, 239. See also Ramirez v. Ramirez, 554 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1977, writ dism'd).
27. Shepard v. Shepard, 546 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ).
28. Id.
29. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2324 (Vernon Supp. 1978). See also TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 11.14(d) (Vernon 1975). See generally Baen-Bec, Inc. v. Tenhoopen, 548 S.W.2d 799
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, no writ); Muldoon v. Musgrave, 545 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
30. 546 S.W.2d at 889.
31. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 131 (Jan. 7, 1978).
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Texas relied upon its earlier opinion in Smith v. Smith,32 and on the opinion
of the Dallas court of civil appeals in Morgan Express, Inc. v. Elizabeth-
Perkins, Inc. ,3 to conclude that the absent respondent is entitled to a
statement of facts even though the verbatim transcript has been waived by
his failure to request a reporter at the trial. If there is no statement of facts,
the respondent is entitled to a new trial. 34 An intermediate appellate court,
however, had held, in Glass v. O'Hearn,35 that if a statement of facts is
supplied in the record, the appellant must accept it.
In Boswell, O'Toole, Davis & Pickering v. Townsend 36 a discharged firm
of attorneys, originally representing the wife, intervened in a divorce pro-
ceeding to recover its fees against both spouses. The trial court dismissed
the intervention against the husband and severed the suit against the wife.
When the firm appealed the dismissal, the appellate court held that because
the intervenor had taken a non-suit prior to the judgment, the intervenor
could not complain that the dismissal of the suit against the husband was
erroneous. Another procedural point was settled in Meshwert v. Meshwert.3 7
In that case the appellant questioned whether an appellate court might
receive a transcript and statement of facts inadvertently filed after sixty
days of judgment within rule 21c. 38 The Supreme Court of Texas held that
the appellate court may receive the profferred matter within fifteen days
following the last date for timely filing if it is accompanied by reasonable
explanation of inadvertence, mistake, or mischance. 39
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
Although all property acquired during marriage is presumed to be commu-
nity, this presumption may be rebutted by a showing that the property was
acquired by gift,' inheritance, partition of a separate interest in an undi-
32. 554 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1976).
33. 525 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd).
34. But see Clayton v. Clayton, 547 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ
dism'd). The petitioner, questioning the validity of two prior divorces, did not satisfy the
prerequisites to a successful bill of review in spite of a lack of transcripts and statements of
fact.
35. 553 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ).
36. 546 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ).
37. 549 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. 1977).
38. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21(c).
39. 549 S.W.2d at 384. The court construed "reasonably explaining" as used in rule 21c to
mean "any plausible statement of circumstances indicating that failure to file within the sixty-
day period was not deliberate or intentional, but was the result of inadvertence, mistake or
mischance." Id. Moreover, the court declared that the motion must be filed within 15 days of
the last date for timely filing or it would not grant leave to file the instrument. Id.
40. The implication or presumption of gift between spouses is a weak one and is easily
rebutted in practice. Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 175 (Tex. 1976) (Reavley, J.,
dissenting). In Glover v. Martin, 544 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ), the
wife withdrew funds from a separate bank account in the form of a cashier's check payable to
husband or wife. Following her death, the husband claimed that she had intended to make an
inter vivos gift to him. The fact that she retained control of the check by making it payable to
herself and her husband and the fact that she never delivered it indicated that she did not intend
a gift of half of it to her husband. In Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Gravitt, 551 S.W.2d 421(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), it was reiterated that pension benefits,
even under a non-contributing plan, are not gifts by an employer to an employee; rather, the
plans are a form of employee compensation. Id. at 423.
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vided property, 4' or as a mutation of separate property. 42 The problem is
commonly one of tracing separate property into a fund where it may have
been so commingled with community property as to lose its identity. 43 If
separate property is brought into a marriage and is invested and reinvested
thereafter in conjunction with community property, its identity must be
traced in order to demonstrate its continued separate character. 44 In Hicks v.
Hicks the Dallas court of civil appeals dealt with an alleged commingled
fund. An ex-wife sought a partition of a workmen's compensation award,
made after a divorce with respect to an injury suffered by the husband
during marriage. 5 The prospective recovery was not dealt with in the di-
vorce decree. The award therefore might have covered compensation for
some lost earning capacity during marriage in addition to that after its
dissolution. On the other hand, since weekly compensation payments had
been received and apparently had been consumed during marriage, these
payments might have fully compensated earning capacity lost during mar-
riage. The court seemingly relied on this conjecture to shift the burden of
proof to the wife to show that a community interest was comprehended
within the award. This burden she failed to discharge. 6
41. Westhoff v. Reitz, 554 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
42. McDade v. Sams, 545 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
43. See generally Comment, Community Property: The Concept of Tracing Ownership, 8
TEX. TECH L. REV. 637 (1977). After the death of a spouse, tracing presents somewhat greater
difficulties of proof than it does if both spouses are living. The probate court is now an
appropriate forum for such an adjudication. See Potter v. Potter, 545 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 5(c), (d) (Vernon
Supp. 1978). See also Parr v. White, 543 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 105, 130 (1977). The dead man's statute poses particular evidentiary prob-
lems. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (Vernon 1926). The surviving spouse may, however,
testify to facts of her own knowledge with respect to tracing a separate property interest. See
Whitis v. Whitis, 549 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ).
44. See Bilek v. Tupa, 549 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
45. 546 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ). The ex-husband had received an
award for each of two injuries. The discussion here is only with respect to the second injury.
The court found that there was no commingling of the award for the first injury with that for the
second; therefore, the award for the second injury could not presumptively constitute commu-
nity property. One should compare the outcome with that in Latham v. Allison, 560 S.W.2d 481(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ). See also Postelnek v. Postelnek, No. 6,609 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso, Sept. 21, 1977, no writ).
46. In Hicks the court cited, but did not really rely on, two earlier cases dealing with future
workmen's compensation awards dealt with by a divorce court. 546 S.W.2d at 74. In Mabry v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 230 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1950, no writ), the wife
was granted one half of a future award to be made to the husband. The insurance company paid
the husband in full and the wife sought her share from the insurance company. The court held
that the decree in favor of the wife was an invalid judicial assignment of workmen's compensa-
tion under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967). This anti-assignment statute
is clearly provided as a protection against creditors' claims, and this case is, therefore,
analogous to a divorce court's handling of railway retirement benefits in Allen v. Allen, 363
S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962, no writ). But see Berg v. Berg, 115 S.W.2d 1171
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1938, writ dism'd). Allen, however, has been superseded by
Eickelberger v. Eickelberger, 557 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ), and
Mabry must give way to Hicks. The California Supreme Court has reached the same conclusion
with respect to railroad retirement benefits as did the Texas court in Eickelberger. In re
Hisquierdo, 19 Cal. 3d 613, 566 P.2d 224, 139 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1977), noted in 4 COMMUNITY
PROP. J. 172 (1977).
In Piro v. Piro, 327 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ dism'd), a division of
workmen's compensation benefits was again considered. Although the court cited Mabry, the
thrust of the decision was much more refined. The wife was given 1/5 of a future award which
the husband might receive for workmen's compensation. When the husband appealed from this
decree, the appellate court struck it down as, in effect, an indefinite or conjectural award
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Apportionment of Interests. It is perhaps inappropriate to use the phrase
"contingent community property," as employed in Cearley v. Cearley,47 to
describe a type of property. It is rather a technique for dealing with an
accruing interest in the context of division on divorce. In Cearley the
supreme court provided for division of pension benefits which might be
received in the future.A Arguably, the principle of contingent community
property may also be applicable to division on death.4 9 While the apportion-
ment of ,separate and community property interests is clearly applicable to
the division of retirement benefits on divorce, the extent to which it may be
applied to other interests has yet to be examined.50 In Taggart v. Taggart,5 1
for example, the supreme court applied the Cearley principle to a pension
interest which had not accrued at the time of the divorce. In Vibrock v.
Vibrock52 , however, the principle's application to an insurance agent's anti-
cipated right to commissions which had not accrued on divorce was posed
but not resolved. The ex-wife sought a partition of her former husband's
commissions allegedly earned, in part at least, during their marriage but not
disposed of on divorce. The trial court entered summary judgment for the
husband. The intermediate appellate court, however, reversed and remand-
ed for a determination of whether there was an interest to divide since it was
possible that the interest might never accrue. The court indicated its reluct-
ance to determine whether there could be a community interest in the
renewal commissions. The court noted that such an extension of the Cearley
principle should be made only by the supreme court. In refusing a writ of
possibly inclusive of separate personalty. The court did not conclude that the decree was in
violation of art. 8306, § 3, but instead held that judicial authority was improperly exercised in
awarding the wife what might be the husband's separate property rather than a portion of the
community. The court reasoned that if the future compensation award were made only for
those earning lost after divorce, the portion decreed to the wife would be from the husband's
separate property. The award was speculative and therefore improper under the circumstances.
In TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-862 (1976) the opinion was expressed that a lump sum
payment to a widow or a widower for workmen's compensation on behalf of a deceased spouse
is not subject to the 4% per annum statutory interest provided for under TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 8306a (Vernon 1967). That article provides that:
[W]here suits are legally brought by any claimant or beneficiary under any of the
provisions of this Act and recovery is had for past due weekly installments, such
claimant or beneficiary shall be entitled to recover interest on such past due
installments at the rate of four (4%) percent, compounded annually.
47. 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976), discussed in McKnight, supra note 21, at 426-30; Note,
Military Retirement Benefits: Community Property as Earned During Marriage, 14 Hous. L.
REV. 925 (1977).
48. 544 S.W.2d at 666.
49. See Valdez v. Ramirez, 558 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ), a
case of accrued and matured pension retirement benefits. If the non-beneficiary spouse dies
while the retirement benefits of the other spouse are still contingent, it may be argued that a
community interest of the spouses may yet accrue or mature. An accrued interest is equivalent
to a vested one; the term "matured" is used to refer to an interest that is payable. See
McKnight, supra note 21, at 426-30, 440-42. See also Massman, Proposed Legislation to
Exempt from Inheritance Taxation the Non-Employee Spouse's Interest, 40 TEX. B.J. 38 (1977).
For a comment on proposals at the national level see Foster, Pensions and Marital Property, 17
FAM. L. NEWSLETrER, No. 4, Summer 1977, at 6.
50. Some further conjectures are examined in McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 105, 120 (1977).
51. 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1977).
52. 549 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 20
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 499 (July 27, 1977).
[Vol. 32
FAMILY LAW: HUSBAND AND WIFE
error the Supreme Court of Texas specifically reserved its opinion on the
community property issue. 3 The California Supreme Court has concluded
that termination rights with respect to renewal commissions do have a
community element in such a case.
54
Cearley 55 and its progeny,56 foreshadowed by the line of cases following
Busby v. Busby, 57 point the way to a reappraisal of characterizing incremen-
tal acquisitions of property interests which arise over an extended period of
time during which the acquirer is alternately married and single. In numer-
ous cases in which the character of retirement benefits has been considered,
little thought has been given to applying the inception of title doctrine to this
sort of property interest. Instead the courts initially characterized benefits
on the basis of vesting without focusing on the argument that characteriza-
tion relates back to the inception of the contract right. The vesting doctrine
of Busby, however, had already been seriously undermined by the lower
appellate courts58 before the supreme court enunciated the contingent com-
munity property doctrine in Cearley. The ways were, therefore, laid for the
application of an apportionment principle to characterize property acquired
incrementally over an extended period of time. For example, if a person
employed for three years while single is thereafter married for six years, and
then is divorced and remains single for a year prior to the division of pension
benefits, the apportionment principle results in characterizing the benefits
as six-tenths community and four-tenths separate. This approach may be
logically applied to ordinary life insurance policies as has been done in some
other community property jurisdictions 5 9 although term life insurance may
be interpreted as a new policy each time a premium is paid to renew the
term. 6° The apportionment principle could also apply to the division of
proceeds of contracts of service extending over periods of different marital
status, 61 as well as to acquisitions by adverse possession in the same situa-
tion. 62 Thus the relation-back principle of the inception of title doctrine
could be swept away. 63
53. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 499 (July 27, 1977); cf. Echols v. Austron, Inc., 529 S.W.2d l4U
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court held that a bonus paid after divorce
to ex-spouse president by his corporate employer was not community property.
54. In re Skaden, 19 Cal. 3d 679, 566 P.2d 249, 139 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1976), rev'd, 61 Cal. App.
3d 682, 132 Cal. Rptr. 524, noted in 4 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 171, 173-74 (1977).
55. 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976). See also Comment, Apportionment of Community Proper-
ty Interests in Prospective Military Retirement Benefits Upon Divorce, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 72
(1977); Note, Community Property-Cearley v. Cearley, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 135 (1977); Note,
Marital Property-Cearley v. Cearley, 8 TEX. TECH L. REV. 834 (1977).
56. Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1977); In re Gongwer, 554 S.W.2d 49 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
57. 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970). See also Note, Military Retirement Benefits as Community
Property-Busby v. Busby, 25 Sw. L.J. 340 (1971).
58. See, e.g., Dessommes v. Dessommes, 505 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw.
L.J. 66, 72-73 (1974).
59. See W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 190-91 (2d ed.
1971). See generally S. SCOVILL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND LIFE INSURANCE (1969).
60. But see McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, writ
ref'd).
61. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 410 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bishop v. Williams, 223 S.W. 512 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1920, writ
ref'd).
62. See Strong v. Garrett, 148 Tex. 265, 224 S.W.2d 471 (1949).
63. The all-or-nothing approach would, therefore, give way to one of sharing. When the
inception of title principle was first authoritatively applied in cases of conditional colonization
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Conflicts of Interest. A recent attorney general's opinion' conjures up
memories of Ma Ferguson and Dickson v. Strickland.65 In Dickson the
supreme court enunciated the unconventional view that Mrs. Ferguson's
salary as governor would be her separate property because her husband had
forfeited his right to share it by his own malfeasance in the same office.
66
The attorney general's opinion employed a more conventional analysis. The
opinion dealt with article 2340, which provides that a county commissioner
must not be directly or indirectly interested in any contract or claim against
the county. Hence if the wife of a commissioner is appointed deputy tax-
assessor-collector, she must serve without pay, since her husband would
otherwise take a community interest in any salary she should receive.
Transactions Between Couples. Transactions between couples intending a
meretricious relationship, those between couples anticipating marriage, and
those between spouses continue to present difficult and interesting prob-
lems. The highest courts of California,67 Minnesota, 68 and Georgia 69 have
recently examined express and implied contracts concerning the mutual
gains of unmarried persons living and working together. In Marvin v. Mar-
vin7" the California court considered the enforcibility of a contract between
a man, then married, and a single woman to live together and share assets
acquired by their individual and mutual efforts. During the course of their
cohabitation the man was divorced. Without recourse to the concept of
informal marriage, which is not recognized in California, the court
concluded that a contract between an unmarried, cohabiting couple to define
the status of property acquisitions is valid provided it is not based explicitly
grants, no thought was apparently given to an apportionment approach. Webb v. Webb, 15 Tex.
275 (1855); Mechaca v. Field, 62 Tex. 135 (1884); Mills v. Brown, 69 Tex. 244, 6 S.W. 612
(1887); Welder v. Lambert, 91 Tex. 510, 44 S.W. 281 (1898); Creamer v. Briscoe, 101 Tex. 490,
109 S.W. 911 (1908). Although little remarked upon at the time, an impetus toward apportion-
ment came from the federal court in Wrightsman v. Commissioner, I I F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1940),
where a migrant executive's annual earnings were treated as community property to the extent
of the proportionate part of the year he lived in Texas. As yet, however, no judicial hints of
application of the apportionment approach beyond the subject matter of pension and retirement
benefits have appeared.
In a different sort of dispute as to characterization of realty acquired by deed dated prior to
the spouse's marriage but acknowledged during marriage, the Amarillo court of civil appeals
held that it was presumed to have been delivered at the time the deed was dated; hence the
property was separate estate. Rogers v. Gunn, 545 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976,
no writ).
64. TEX. Arr'v. GEN. Op. No. H-993 (1977).
65. 114 Tex. 176, 265 S.W. 1012 (1923).
66. This approach is similar to that of the South African Court in Potgeiter v. Potgeiter and
another, [1959] 1 S.A. 194, where the husband's recovery for alienation of affection was said to
be his separate property because of his wife's own involvement with the marital poacher. That
decision can be defended on other grounds, such as those underlying Graham v. Franco, 488
S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972).
67. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). See also Kay
& Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 937 (1977); Comment,
Property Rights Upon Termination of Unmarried Cohabitation: Marvin v. Marvin, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1708 (1977); Foster & Freed, Non-Marital Partners, 17 FAM. L. NEWSLETrER No. 3,
Spring 1977, at 6.
68. Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977).
69. Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81 (Ga. 1977).
70. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
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and primarily on the sexual relationship.7 1 Although the spouse might com-
plain, the fact that a party to the contract was actually married at the time
the contract was entered into did not render property dealings between the
parties void ab initio. By way of obiter dictum the court further noted that a
court might inquire into the conduct of a cohabiting couple to determine the
existence of an implied undertaking, a joint venture, or a partnership. 72 The
Minnesota court also considered the propriety of implying contractual
undertakings in such circumstances. 73 The Georgia court rejected property
consequences of a meretricious relationship out of hand. 74 One commen-
tator has speculated 75 that these decisions may have some impact on the
future course of Texas law in dealing with such arrangements.
A recent Texas case dealt with a meretricious relationship, although the
issues raised were not similar to those of Marvin. In that case76 the facts did
not show a contract between the unmarried couple who had lived together
for several years. 77 But whether or not there is a contractual arrangement, if
such a relationship ends as a result of the death of one of the parties, a will in
favor of a second mate would preclude some dispute in those circum-
stances .78
In disputes between two persons who claim property rights by virtue of
asserted marriages to the same individual, the actual spouse, or the children
of the valid marriage, have prevailed except against a putative spouse who
entered into the relationship in good faith; even then, however, they have
prevailed only with respect to property acquired while the putative spouse
remained married in good faith. 79 The measure of the putative spouse's
property interest, however, has been much disputed. Several questions are
posed by the Texas authorities. (1) Is the putative spouse to be treated as an
actual spouse with respect to property acquisitions of the union as long as it
subsists in good faith on the part of the claimant? That is, with respect to
gains of the putative union, are the putative spouse's property rights to be
exactly the same as those of an actual spouse? (2) Or, are the rights of the
71. Id. at 674, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
72. Id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32.
73. Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977).
74. Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81 (Ga. 1977).
75. Dougherty, Dissolution of Non-marital Cohabitation and Common Law Marriage, in
MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION IN TEXAS J-1, J-8 (1977).
76. Simon v. Watson, 539 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
77. But cf. Jernigan v. Scott, 518 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (in dispute between wife who had entered into separation agreement with deceased
husband and woman who asserted that she had later married him believing that he was single,
court sustained validity of separation agreement and therefore did not reach any issue of alleged
putative marital status or claims that might have been contractually based).
78. In a case of a New York second marriage-though perhaps putative by Texas stan-
dards-the bigamous husband's bequest of all his property to the second "wife" was not
entitled to a marital deduction for estate tax purposes under I.R.C. § 2056. Estate of Goldwater
v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1976); cf. Lee v. Commissioner, 550 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir.
1977) (husband and purported second wife not allowed to file a joint federal income tax return
after state law consulted as to whether marriage absolutely void; implication that if state law
viewed marital status as valid, joint filing might be allowed).
79. Davis v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1975). Once entered into, a putative marriage
exists as a matter of law until the person asserting it has real knowledge of an impediment to it
under the circumstances of the case. Id. at 606. For further authorities see McKnight, supra




putative spouse limited to that property the acquisition of which the putative
spouse contributed and to the extent of participation in acquisition? (3)
Further, does merely acting as a spouse constitute contribution to acquisi-
tion? If so, there is really no difference between approaches (1) and (2). If,
however, the putative spouse's claim is limited to that property which was
acquired by his overt effort, at least in part, a factual determination must be
made if the second alternative approach is adopted. On the basis of all the
authorities the better view is that a putative spouse's interest is that which
would be community property in the case of an actual marriage.
Nevertheless, even when that issue is resolved, the problem of apportion-
ment of interests between three potential claimants remains. 80 If the bad-
faith bigamist and those claiming from him are excluded, an equal division
can be made of the acquisitions of the putative marriage between the actual
spouse and the putative spouse. The Texas courts, however, have not
approached the problem in this way and a clear resolution of this question
remains to be made. Nor have the appellate courts distinguished between
the situation involving a bad-faith bigamist and a three-way dispute in which
all claimants, or those from whom their claims derive, were in good faith
during all times relevant to the controversy." In a legal environment such as
our own where divorce is easily available, moreover, there are perhaps
almost as many good faith bigamists as there are those in bad faith. At any
rate, the good-faith bigamist is not infrequently encountered in practice.8 2
A different sort of situation is presented when a claimant was not in good
faith in entering into the relationship, and, therefore, was never more than a
pretended spouse from the start, or later learned the truth and then became a
mere pretended spouse. From that time forward, the claimant of the wholly
or partly meretricious relationship has been excluded, in Texas, from assert-
ing a right to any property acquired while the relationship subsisted in bad
faith on the claimant's part. The same result prevails when both parties to
the liaison are single, unless an informal marriage can be established. In
either case, any resort to a property claim based on contractual principles
would previously have been rejected on the ground of public policy. 83 This
80. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 68 N.5
(1975). Williams, supra note 79, at 142-44, regards the question as settled in favor of the
putative spouse's entitlement to one-half while the legal wife and husband take one-fourth each.
See also Note, Family Law and Community Property-Putative Marriage-Division of Property,
I I Sw. L.J. 245 (1957).
81. Nor would one expect that the commentators on the Hispanic sources of our law would
have devoted much attention to this situation; the likelihood that such a situation could be
presented would have been slim due to the unavailability of divorce as we know it.
82. Such a situation often arises in this way. After a period of separation the wife informs
her husband that she has filed a petition for divorce and requests that he execute a waiver of
citation to save her additional expense. He executes the waiver and assumes that his wife will
pursue her suit to judgment. In the course of time the husband remarries. Some years later he
encounters his wife and discovers that she did not pursue her divorce proceeding-usually
because she failed to pay her lawyer. As a result, all three persons have claims in the continuing
assets of the one or two marriages, although the first wife is clearly at fault under these facts for
misleading her husband. If she is to share in the gains of the husband, it is only proper that her
gains should also be included in making a decision.
83. No Texas case has been found in which recovery has been sought for fraud by a person
who entered into a good-faith marriage which is later discovered to be void.
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policy was rooted in the criminal consequences of adultery and fornication"
as well as in the sanctity of marriage. Since 1973, however, the criminal
aspects of the policy no longer exist in Texas.85 In Marvin, as a matter of
general policy, the California Supreme Court could not accept a contract
based merely on sexual grounds.86 But a longstanding cohabital relationship
based on sex alone would be hard to imagine.
While the California court did not formulate precise measures of recovery
as between the parties to the contract, as to third persons the court indicated
that ordinary rules of principal and agent, holding-out, and partnership
liability would apply. 87 In Texas persons who hold themselves out as joint-
venturers take the consequences of joint-venture liability.88 On the other
hand, those who merely hold themselves out as marital-joint venturers
seemingly do not induce others to rely on the higher standard of partnership
liability.89 As between the couple an express undertaking to share liability
may exist or such an agreement may be inferred from the circumstances of
their association. An agreement to share the net gains of a non-marital
relationship clearly presupposes some consideration of liability and loss.
If a marital relationship is not indicated by a couple's agreement or
conduct, the consequences of their cohabital relationship are those of an
imputed partnership 9° rather than a putative marriage. If, as the California
court suggested, equity and fair dealing are to be the guides to property
division when the relationship disintegrates, in such instances a closer study
of the parties' conduct may be required than is needed in a divorce situa-
tion.9' The California court left open those matters analogous to spousal
support obligations growing out of such a relationship.92 The Minnesota
court93 also confined its consideration to the property acquired during the
relationship, resorting to a principle of implied gift on which to ground its
opinion. The Georgia court, 94 on the other hand, wholly rejected recovery as
based on an immoral consideration. A similar dispute has not been before a
Texas appellate court in recent years. 95
84. See Hayworth v. Williams, 102 Tex. 308, 116 S.W. 43 (1909); Meador v. Ivy, 390
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, no writ).
85. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. app. arts. 499-504 (Vernon 1974) (repealed 1973).
86. 18 Cal. App. 3d 660, 671, 557 P.2d 106, 113-14, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 822-23 (1976).
87. Id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
88. See, e.g., Heinrich v. Wharton County Livestock, Inc., 557 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ) (characteristics of joint ventures); Yorfino v. Ferguson,
552 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App -El Paso 1977, no writ) (partners are jointly and severally
liable).
89. But see Dougherty, supra note 75, at J-4.
90. By the very nature of the arrangement, some sexual relationship seems to be presup-
posed, although only the bi-sexual relationship is here under consideration. This discussion
does not consider uni-sexual relationships or those involving dependency without regard to sex
(see, e.g., Hooks v. Bridgewater, I I Tex. 122, 229 S.W. 1114 (1921)), or communal arrange-
ments which may or may not involve sex.
91. Dougherty, supra note 75, at J.-6.
92. For further discussion of Marvin see Kurtz, supra note 3, at 122-23; Foster, Nonmarit-
al Partners: Sex and Serendipity From Coast to Coast, 18 FAM. L. NEWSLETrER No. 1, Fall
1977, at 5, 6. Pre-Marvin literature includes Folberg & Buren, Domestic Partnership: A
Proposal for Dividing the Property of Unmarried Families, 12 WILLAMETrE L.J. 453 (1976).
93. Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977).
94. Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81 (Ga. 1977).
95. The facts which produced Grigsby v. Reib, 105 Tex. 597, 153 S.W. 1124 (1913),
however, might today produce a dispute somewhat similar to that in Marvin.
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Two appellate courts have considered the consequences of marriage
contracts between couples planning to marry. 96 In Williams v. Williams' the
proposed wife had renounced by contract all interests in the proposed
husband's separate property, including homestead rights, home furnishings,
and the family car.9 8 When the marriage was terminated by the husband's
death, four months after its celebration, the surviving widow and the hus-
band's children of his previous marriage disputed both the widow's right to
occupy the homestead and to exercise her statutory rights with respect to all
the husband's exempt personalty. The Austin court of civil appeals held that
the contract was invalid as to all exempt property because a right to property
not yet acquired cannot be renounced. This conclusion was clearly contrary
to the long standing, albeit unconsidered, precedents sustaining contracts to
assign a possibility of inheritance. 99
The argument applied in Williams to a future homestead, however, is
equally applicable to future gains of the marriage. In Huff v. Huff" the
Waco court of civil appeals sustained the constitutional validity of section
5.41 of the Family Code and its application to a marriage contract which
provided for mutual renunciation of what would be community acquisitions.
The contract was entered into in Louisiana by a Louisiana couple who were
married in 1967101 and moved to Texas in 1968 after the effective date of the
new provisions of article 4610, now codified as section 5.41.102 The court
stated that the contract was valid in Louisiana and held that it was also valid
under Texas law which was in effect when the couple moved to Texas.' °3
96. On marriage contracts in general see Neely, Marriage Contracts for Better or for
Worse, JURIS DOCTOR, Sept. 1977, at 38.
97. 548 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ granted).
98. The contract also provided for mutual renunciation of what would have been future
community acquisitions, but this aspect of the contract did not provoke dispute because of the
short duration of the marriage.
99. See, e.g., Hale v. Hollon, 90 Tex. 427, 39 S.W. 287 (1897); Gottwald v. Warlick, 125
S.W.2d 1060 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1939, no writ).
100. 554 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ dism'd).
101. At that time there were two impediments to valid marriage contracts. The first one was
constitutional. See, e.g., Gorman v. Gause, 56 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, holding
approved); Castro v. lIlies, 22 Tex. 479 (1858) (semble). The proponent of the constitutional
validity of § 5.41 must regard with some apprehension the supreme court's citation of Gorman
in Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977), in its application of a strict
construction of the constitutional definition of marital property to § 3.63 of the Texas Family
Code.
The second impediment was the effect of the old provisions of art. 4610 which were in effect
until Jan. 1, 1968. This statute of 1840 had caused many Texas marriage contracts to fail. See
McKnight, supra note 43, at 111-12. See also Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1964); Watts
v. Watts, 390 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hayes v. Hayes, 378
S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1964, writ dism'd); Lieber v. Mercantile Nat'l
Bank, 331 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Texas provision
was modelled on a section of the Louisiana Code under which marriage contracts have been
consistently sustained.
In Frederick v. Frederick, 44 I11. App. 3d 578, 358 N.E.2d 398 (1976), a marriage contract was
attacked as invalid because it had as part of its purpose a tax evasion scheme. The contract
provided, in part, that if the wife inherited her husband's lands over which she would have a
testamentary power of appointment, she would convey those lands to the husband's children.
Hence, if the term of the agreement were valid, she would have no general testamentary power
entitling the property to a marital deduction. The court held that the contract which had as its
purpose a fraud on the United States Treasury was unenforceable, and since this provision of
the marriage contract was not severable, the whole contract failed.
102. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.41 (Vernon 1975).
103. 554 S.W.2d at 843-44.
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Castro v. Illies' °4 also involved a foreign premarital contract entered into by
a couple who later moved to Texas. A distinction between Huff and Castro
is that both Texas statutory and constitutional provisions have been radical-
ly changed during the eighty year interval between the two decisions. The
marriage contract statute has been modernized by removal of the reference
to the forced heirship statute which was repealed in 1856; 05 the Texas
Constitution was significantly altered in 1948 to allow partitions of commu-
nity property during marriage. Since the strictures of old article 4610 were
considered equally applicable to both marital partitions and marriage
contracts,1°6 the liberalized constitutional provision dealing with partitions
should lead the courts to construe the amended marriage contract statute as
one allowing premarital contractual arrangements which are designed to
avoid the need for partitioning community property.
In Martin v. Flener0 7 a property settlement agreement made in anticipa-
tion of divorce recited that the property mentioned in the agreement was all
of the community property which the spouses possessed. A post-divorce
suit was brought twenty-one years later for a determination of the character
of an unmentioned tract acquired during marriage and hence presumed to be
community property. Despite the recital, the court held that the property
was community. 108
III. DIVISION ON DIVORCE
Jurisdiction. Although rarely relevant to the validity of the divorce it-
self,109 personal jurisdiction of the respondent in a divorce proceeding is
very relevant to division of property,"' and to fixing parental rights and
104. 22 Tex. 479 (1858).
105. 1856 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 85, § 1, at 5, 4 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 423 (1898). There
is a surviving reference to the institution of forced heirship in TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63
(Vernon 1975). The provisions of id. § 4.01, derived from old art. 4627 and its 1840 predecessor,
were initially designed to insure the applicability of Texas matrimonial property law in spite of
different rules applicable at the time and place of marriage. See Thomas & Thomas, Community
Property and the Conflict of Laws: A Recapitulation, 4 Sw. L.J. 46, 52-57 (1950).
106. See Graser v. Graser, 147 Tex. 404, 215 S.W.2d 867 (1948); Weaver v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 490 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, no writ).
107. 543 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
108. Id. at 759. A recital in a divorce decree that there was no community property was
similarly construed in Clendenin v. Krock, 527 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975,
no writ). In McDade v. Sams, 545 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no
writ), the recital in the divorce decree that there was no community property was not even
considered in determining the character of property acquired during the marriage but not dealt
with in the divorce decree.
109. Such a rare case is presented when the petitioner is a domiciliary of Texas only by
virtue of the respondent's domicile there. See Shankles v. Shankles, 445 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1969, no writ). See also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.21 (Vernon 1975), which was
not in effect when Shankles was decided. Id. Section 3.24 was also subsequently enacted.
Under § 3.24 it appears that a spouse of a nonresident but domiciliary Texas serviceman, or
other absent Texan, may maintain a suit for divorce in Texas without showing any Texas
rsidence on the part of the petitioner. Personal jurisdiction of the petitioner or the respondent is
necessary in order to give the court in rem jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage. Such personal
jurisdiction is normally based on domicile. Jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary, but resident,
serviceman is based on legislative enactment. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.23 (Vernon 1975). The
constitutional validity of § 3.23 under federal standards was not in issue, but was assumed in
Fox. v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
110. In Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ), the power of the
court went unchallenged even though in personam jurisdiction had not been obtained. Although
the court assumed that it had the power to deal with property within Texas, that power is very
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responsibilities with respect to children. 1' The long-arm statutes 112 based on
prior marital contact with Texas provide a means for obtaining jurisdiction
over an out-of-state respondent, but their use may generate conflict of laws
and concurrent jurisdiction questions if, at his current state of domicile, the
respondent has already commenced, or later commences, a divorce pro-
ceeding." 3 Scott v. Scott 14 focused on the power of the divorce court to
dissolve a marriage after similar proceedings had been initiated in Califor-
nia. A Houston court of civil appeals concluded that because the wife had
not satisfactorily proved that she was not subject to long-arm jurisdiction
under the Family Code"' and because the California court had not finally
disposed of the issue of residence, the Texas trial court had properly denied
her motion to stay the proceeding and had subsequently granted the divorce
without offending notions of comity.
116
Although a negotiated property settlement 17 generally precludes the need
for judicial scrutiny of a property division, the decision in Eggemeyer v.
Eggemeyer" 8 may cause an increase in disputes regarding the characteriza-
tion of marital property as well as increased reliance on tracing. It may also
influence more frequent recourse to trial by jury for a determination of the
property's character.
Although some trial courts have been inclined to grant a divorce and
postpone consideration of property division, the appellate courts have unan-
seriously doubted. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977). Without personal
jurisdiction over the respondent, the court in Fox concluded that it lacked the power to deal
with property located outside Texas. As to the power of a Texas court to deal with foreign
realty by exercising its in personam power over a litigant within its jurisdiction who is in control
of that property, see Hedley v. duPont, 558 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1977, no writ) (a non-divorce case). See also McKnight, supra note 21, at 449, 483. On the
basis of comity a sister state may enforce a Texas in personam order to convey realty located
there just as a Texas court will enforce a similar foreign order. McElreath v. McElreath, 162
Tex. 190, 195, 345 S.W. 722, 725 (1961). For the effect given to a California in personam order
in Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal. 2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957), to achieve division of foreign realty
purchased with community property, see Rozan v. Rozan, 150 Mont. 121, 431 P.2d 870 (1967),
and Rozan v. Rozan, 129 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1964). See also Note, Community Property in a
Common Law Jurisdiction: A Seriously Neglected Area of the Law, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 77
(1976).
111. In Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ), the appellate
court acceded to the argument of the respondent not subject to in personam jurisdiction that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to affect the conservatorship of the children, who may never have
been in Texas, but apparently rejected the argument that jurisdiction was lacking to order the
petitioner to support the children.
112. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1978); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 203 1b (Vernon 1964). See Comment, The Texas Long-Arm Statute, Article 2031b: A New
Process is Due, 30 Sw. L.J. 747 (1976). See also Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 408 (Tex Civ. App -
Austin 1977, no writ); Scott v. Scott, 554 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.]
1977, no writ).
113. See Scott v. Scott, 554 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist] 1977, no writ);
Layton v. Layton, 538 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Note,
supra note 18.
114. 554 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ).
115. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
116. 554 S.W.2d at 278. See also Layton v. Layton, 538 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1976, no writ), cited in Note, supra note 18.
117. Some of the tax pitfalls in such arrangements are indicated in du Canto, Divorce
Settlements, 17 FAM. L. NEWSLETrER No. 4, Summer 1977, at I. See Deyoe v. Commissioner,
66 T.C. 904 (1976); Carriers v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975); Rev. Rul. 76-146, 1976-1 C.B.
144; Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213.
118. 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977); see text accompanying notes 128-40 infra.
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imously rejected the idea of such severance. 119 The Garrison cases 20 and
Austin v. Austin'2 ' were suits for divorce in which dismissal was requested
because one of the spouses died during the proceedings. In the Garrison
proceedings an order of divorce was entered, but division of property was
postponed. The consequence was that no final judgment had been entered
and the suit had abated due to the death of a party. In Austin, however, the
court had made an oral adjudication of its decision regarding the manner of
division, as well as a docket entry that the divorce was "granted as prayed
for."I 22 The appellate court concluded that this constituted a final judgment
for divorce and a division of property. 23 Thus, the crucial issue in determin-
ing whether a cause of action can be dismissed upon the death of a spouse is
whether the court rendered a final judgment. 124
With respect to property division, the court must hear the evidence
concerning the property before ordering its division. In Rutherford v.
Rutherford,'25 for instance, one judge heard the evidence and another made
the decision. Here a clear deprivation of property without due course of
law occurred inasmuch as the appellant was denied the opportunity to be
heard.126 Somewhat startlingly, a due course of law argument was relied on
in Eggemeyer where the majority of the Supreme Court of Texas held that
divestiture of title to separate real property was an unconstitutional exercise
of power on the part of a divorce court. 27 If the divestiture of title to
separate property is unconstitutional as a deprivation of a vested right, it
119. Garrison v. Texas Commerce Bank, 560 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1977, no writ), a sequel to Garrison v. Mead, 553 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1977, no writ); Adam v. Stewart, 552 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1977, no writ); Campbell v. Campbell, 550 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no
writ); Reed v. Williams, 545 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Civ. App .- San Antonio 1976, no writ). After
judgment the issues are, in effect, severable if an appealis taken only with respect to property
division and not on the granting of the divorce itself. See, e.g., Piro v. Piro, 327 S.W.2d 335
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ dism'd). For a complete discussion of non-divestiture
of separate property in a divorce action in Texas see Note, Division of Separate Real Property in
Divorce Action: Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 31 Sw. L.J. 934 (1977).
120. Garrison v. Texas Commerce Bank, 560 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1977, not writ); Garrison v. Mead, 553 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1977, no writ).
121. 553 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ dism'd).
122. Id. at 10.
123. Id. at 11.
124. See also Dunn v. Dunn, 439 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. 1969); Deen v. Deen, 530 S.W.2d 913
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 72-73 (1976).
125. 554 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ). But cf. Fortenberry v.
Fortenberry, 545 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ) (no error found where due
to death and subsequent appointments one district judge decided the case, another entered
judgment and a third filed conclusions of law and findings of fact).
126. TEX. CoNST. art. I, § 19. In some instances, however, it may be appropriate for an
appellate court to remand a case for a new trial concerning disposition of a particular asset or
liability in the light of prior disposition of other assets and liabilities. McCartney v. McCartney,
548 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ) (remand limited to dealing
only with federal tax liability). In Quesada v. Quesada, 547 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1977, no writ), remand seemed limited merely to a more precise description, rather
than a division, of realty.
127. 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977). The response of the dissenting opinion to this argument of
"unconstitutional taking of private property and the gift of it to another person without a
justifying public purpose" is acerbic: "If this [constitutional] rule applies in the instant case to
prohibit the divestiture of one spouse's title to separate property in order to equitably divide the
property of the marriage, I suggest that the enforcement of a personal injury judgment is
similarly prohibited." Id. at 148.
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also follows that a divestiture of any part of a spouse's community property,
which is similarly vested, is also unconstitutional. No member of the court,
however, seemed willing to carry constitutional logic this far.
In Eggemeyer 28 the long wrangle over the proper construction of section
3.63 of the Texas Family Code was finally resolved. The court relied on the
further constitutional argument that the definition of separate property in
article XVI, section 15, is exclusive and hence an award of one spouse's
separate property to the other is forbidden. This literal interpretation of the
constitutional definition is, however, out of step with the court's approach
when it last examined that provision. 129
Although these constitutional arguments were offered in support of the
conclusion reached by the court, the decision of the court rests primarily on
the legislative history and internal construction of the Family Code. First,
the court pointed out that the legislature did not intend to change the
prevailing law when section 3.63 was enacted. 130 Secondly, the provisions of
section 14.05(a) complement those of section 3.63 in providing that a
spouse's property may be administered, not divested, to discharge the duty
of child support. Finally, the majority of the court relied on the statutory
language that empowers the divorce court to divide "the estate of the
parties."' 3 1 The court concluded that the reference to "estate" in the singu-
lar denotes only the community estate. 32 The court thereby tacitly overruled
the interpretation in Hedtke v. Hedtke133 that "estate" means "property."
One may infer from the court's language in Eggemeyer'34 that it limits the
holding in Hedtke' 35 to permit utilization of a separate homestead for the
support of children during their minority.' 36 The court, however, did not
specifically overrule the award in Hedtke of the husband's separate home-
stead to the wife for life. But when the wife has no minor children in her
custody, an award of the husband's separate homestead to her is clearly
contrary to Eggemeyer and holdings to the contrary are inferentially over-
ruled.'37 Eggemeyer need not be read so broadly as to preclude the fixing of a
lien on separate realty to assure payment of a monetary award ancillary to
property division. The validity of this practice has been defended on the
ground that such a lien is no more than a tentative divestiture since ultimate
128. Id; see Note, supra note 119; Note, Community Property-Division of Property on
Divorce-Spouse Cannot be Divested of Title to Separate Real Property Under Texas Family
Code § 3.63, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 331 (1977); Note, Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer: An Exercise in
Judicial Legislation?, 14 Hous. L. REV. 1104 (1977).
129. Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972). The court's interpretation in Eggemey-
er harks back to Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925). The dissenting justices
in Eggemeyer pointed out that the catalogue of exceptions to the literal interpretation are now
so numerous that reliance on a literal pproach is untenable. See 554 S.W.2d at 147. See also
McKnight, supra note 5, at 337.
130. 554 S.W.2d at 139; see McKnight, supra note 5, at 337.
131. 554 S.W.2d at 139.
132. Id.
133. 112 Tex. 404, 408, 248 S.W. 21, 22 (1923).
134. 554 S.W.2d at 141-42.
135. 112 Tex. at 411, 248 S.W. at 23.
136. Use of a separate homestead for children over 18 who are unable to support themselves
may possibly come within the court's analysis.
137. See, e.g., Bush v. Bush, 237 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950, no writ);
Clark v. Clark, 35 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1930, writ dism'd).
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divestiture by foreclosure is essentially voluntary in that it may be avoided
by compliance with the court's order to pay.' 38
With respect to the division of separate personalty, the last statutory
argument (community estate of the parties) and the first constitutional one
(due course of law) are equally applicable to both separate personalty and
separate realty, but divestiture of the former was not before the court.' 39 In
spite of the broad language of Eggemeyer which may be interpreted to
preclude divestiture of separate personalty, several intermediate appellate
courts have approved division of separate personalty as though Eggemeyer
had not been decided.14
0
Reimbursement. Although separate realty, and seemingly separate person-
alty, is to be dealt with on divorce only as the needs of children may
demand, (1) reimbursement of the separate estate may be awarded, 14' (2)
reimbursement of the community by a separate estate may be ordered,
42
and (3) the extent of the separate estate belonging to each spouse is con-
sidered in dividing the community assets and liabilities.
143 In Hale v. Hale144
the husband asserted a right to reimbursement for the labor, talent, and
industry which he had used to enhance the value of his wife's separate
property. Rejecting the husband's claim, the Texarkana court of civil ap-
peals held that there is no right of reimbursement for labor; there is only a
right of reimbursement for the expenditure of funds. 45 The court supported
this conclusion by drawing a negative inference from three supreme court
cases which had considered reimbursement for funds only.' 46 Although
ascertaining the value of uncompensated labor is difficult, the right to such
reimbursement should not be excluded merely because it was not claimed in
past cases. The Texarkana court also rejected the husband's reliance upon
the ambiguous discussion of reimbursement for management of community
property in the opinion on remand in Norris v. Vaughn. 47 The supreme
138. Smith v. Smith, 187 S.W.2d 116, 121 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945, no writ).
139. The court in Eggemeyer criticized the overbreadth of the language in Hedtke that allows
divestiture of separate personalty in favor of a spouse, although that issue was not before the
court in Hedtke either. 554 S.W.2d at 141-42.
140. Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 557 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no
writ). The court interpreted Eggemeyer to mean that divestiture of separate personalty upon
divorce is permissible. Cf. Musslewhite v. Musslewhite, 555 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1977, writ dism'd) (reaching same result without discussion of Eggemeyer); Campbell v.
Campbell, 554 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ) (no discussion of
Eggemeyer). See also Williams v. Williams, 537 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no
writ); Roberts v. Roberts, 535 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ). In order to
counteract part of the effect of Eggemeyer the Council of the Family Law Section of the State
Bar of Texas is recommending enactment of the California concept of quasi-community
property for purposes of division on divorce. Apart from the inevitable impact of such a change
on the law of decedents' estates, this seems something of an overreaction.
141. Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935).
142. Colden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 171 S.W.2d 328 (1943).
143. Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1974) (court considered extent of spouses' separate
property in ordering division of property upon divorce).
144. 557 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ).
145. Id. at 615.
146. Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1964); Lindsay v. Clayman, 151 Tex. 593, 254
S.W.2d 777 (1952); Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935).
147. 278 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1955, no writ), discussed in Hale v.
Hale, 557 S.W.2d 614, 615-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ).
1978]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
court's prior opinion in Norris,48 however, did not reject reimbursement for
labor as a general proposition.
Norris involved a situation in which a partnership to which the husband
belonged prior to marriage acquired property during marriage through the
expenditure of partnership funds and the skill of the individual partners.
Putting aside the use of funds, which were treated as reimbursable, 49 the
court' 5 imputed the efforts of a partner in acquiring property for their
partnership to the husband. By so doing, the court attributed the partner's
skill and talent to the husband and thus to the community.151 Therefore, in
Norris, a dispute between the husband and the wife's heir with respect to
property acquired by the partnership, there was nothing to reimburse on
behalf of the community. Community efforts had contributed to community
acquisition. To speak of reimbursement in that context was meaningless.
But if the husband had used his community efforts to enhance the value of
the wife's separate property, as the husband did in Hale, allowing reim-
bursement in favor of the community would be appropriate just as allowing
reimbursement of separate funds expended for community property en-
hancement would be proper. 152 In the earlier opinion in Welder v. Lambert'3
the supreme court specifically referred to reimbursement for "labor or
funds" expended. 54 That was a case where a right of reimbursement was
claimed for the efforts expended by a spouse for the benefit of his own
separate estate.
Factors Affecting Division. Various factors' 55 affect the division of prop-
148. 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953), rev'g 256 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1952).
149. It cannot be determined from the reports whether the right of reimbursement was being
claimed by the partnership or by the husband directly. The end result was that the husband was
asserting a right of set-off to the claim of the wife's heir to community property held by him.
150. 152 Tex. at 500, 260 S.W.2d at 682.
151. When Norris was decided Texas adhered to the aggregate, as opposed to the entity,
theory of partnership. Nonetheless, the court at times alluded to the partnership, which was
formed before the husband's marriage, as a separate property interest. At that time, however,
only partnership property acquired before marriage would have had a separate character, and
only to the extent of the husband's undivided interests therein. Property acquired by the
partners during marriage would have been community property insofar as it represented the
husband's share therein as a consequence of his efforts as a partner. Today Texas adheres to
the entity partnership theory. Under this approach, if a partnership is formed prior to marriage,
the husband's share in the partnership remains a separate property interest during the marriage.
The community may, however, have a right of reimbursement for the value of the husband's
community efforts used to enhance the value of his separate partnership interest. With respect
to a partnership entered into during marriage today, the community has an interest in the
partnership but not in specific partnership property. On dissolution of the partnership or sale of
the partnership interest, the value of that interest can be realized.
152. It is readily apparent that reimbursement for separate labor does not exist in this
context, because separate labor produces community gains.
153. 91 Tex. 510, 44 S.W. 281 (1898).
154. Id. at 526, 44 S.W. at 287.
155. For a discussion of Texas law on criteria, standards, and division of property see
McKnight, supra note 21, at 433. See also Pena, Outline brief: division of marital property, 12
TRIAL LAW. F. No. 3, 1978, at 10, 12. For a more general treatment see Foster & Freed, From a
Survey of Matrimonial Law in the United States: Distribution of Property Upon Dissolution, 3
COMMUNITY PROP. J. 231 (1976); Foster, Pensions and Marital Property 17 FAM. L. NEWSLET-
TER No. 4, Summer 1977, at 6.
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erty: disparate earning capacity, 5 6 cash flow,15 attorney's1 58 and auditor's
fees,5 9 consequences of a marriage contract,16° disposition of the home-
stead,16' and tax liability. 62 Yet courts have not focused on the need for a
rational approach to the property and claim disposition on marital dissolu-
tion.
Although Texas law has provided equitably, if not altogether rationally,
for division of the community estate on divorce, it has failed to provide for
the innocent spouse when there is little, if any, community property to
divide upon dissolution. Although the Family Law Section of the State Bar
of Texas has recommended legislation that provides a discretionary read-
justment for up to five years, the legislature has not favored this sugges-
tion.161 Since the criteria for such an allowance have not been spelled out or
explained, the legislature has hesitated to leave the matter to the discretion
of the judiciary. Nevertheless, Texas law would be improved by such an
addition, if proper safeguards against abuse can be formulated, and if a
proper juridical basis can be provided to compensate an injured spouse.
Since the adoption of the first Texas divorce act in 1841,164 Texas law has
provided temporary alimony to the wife, and since 1969 to the husband, 65 in
recognition of the right to spousal support during marriage. Because the
marital bond was not severed by judicial separation, the ecclesiastic courts
had granted the innocent wife continued support, called alimony. When the
secular courts began to grant complete dissolution of marriage, they engraf-
ted the concept of alimony onto secular divorce, usually in the form of a
support for the ex-wife until remarriage. Such awards were based upon the
fault of the husband, but as the name of the relief implies, it was an
adaptation of an ecclesiastical institution that had lost touch with its rational
basis, that is, the provision for continued support during marriage. In spite
of frequent complaints about its use, the institution has been adopted in all
156. Bokhoven v. Bokhoven, 559 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ); Clay v.
Clay, 550 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Tex. C:iv. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1977, no writ); Smallwood v.
Smallwood, 548 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ).
157. Jackson v. Jackson, 552 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
158. Mills v. Mills, 559 S.W. 2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ);Trevino v.
Trevino, 555 S.W.2d 792, 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ); Gwartney v.
Dahlin & Fitch, 551 S.W.2d 781, 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ); Haggard v.
Haggard, 550 S.W. 2d 374, 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ); Fortenberry v. Forten-
berry, 545 S.W. 2d 40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ); Comment, Award of Attorney's
Fees in Divorce Litigation in Texas, 13 Hous L. REV. 1016 (1976). For tax considerations see
Jimmie T. Jernigan, 1975-32 T.C.M. (P-H) 75,132 (1975); Brock, Statutory Attorney Fees in
Texas, 40 TEX. B.J. 139, 142 (1977) (where a very questionable comment on § 3.65 of the Texas
Family Code was made); Note, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees in Divorce: "Necessities" or
"Factors in Property Division"?, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 172 (1977).
159. Clay v. Clay, 550 S.W.2d 730, 735 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ).
160. Huff v. Huff, 554 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ dism'd).
161. Delaney v. Delaney, No. 1724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan, 18, 1977, no
writ). The court may partition the community homestead and sell it to achieve partition, but it
cannot order that proceeds be applied to general debts.
162. McCartney v. McCartney, 548 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977,
no writ) (court remanded case to trial court for sole purpose of determining appropriate
disposition of parties' respective income tax liabilities).
163. See Adams, Proposed Revisions of the Family Code, 37 TEX. B.J. 1159, 1162 (1974).
164. 1841 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony, §§ 1-14, at 19-22, 2 H.
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 483-86 (1898).
165. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.59 (Vernon 1975).
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states except Texas and Pennsylvania166 and in a very small way in Delaware
and North Carolina.
Nevertheless, there is no sound reason that support, as such, should
continue after dissolution of marriage. If there is some reason in law for
granting a monetary judgment on divorce, that reason should be identified
for what it is. The social purpose advanced to defend alimony in many
states-that it provides for the needy, unskilled and lazy-cannot be ration-
ally justified in a legal system that recognizes absolute dissolution of mar-
riage and does not discriminate because of sex. 167 If, under the circum-
stances, a breach of obligation has occurred which should be compensated
as a matter of law, an award of damages rather than support should be made.
It is incongruous that damages for breach of an executory contract to marry
are assessed on the usual grounds for breach of contracts generally' 68 where-
as liability for breach of an executed contract of marriage is limited in Texas
to the accumulated assets of the partnership. 169
Until 1970 Texas divorces were grounded almost wholly on fault. As long
as this was so, the reason underlying disposition of claims as between the
spouses went unquestioned because the juridical concepts of fault and
breach are so closely related. Because no-fault divorce has become the usual
practice 170 since its inception in 1969, justifying disposition of claims on the
basis of fault is difficult. Texas law is therefore faced with a choice: either
(1) to treat marital claims as well as divorce as unrelated to fault and to
divide the related assets, liabilities, and claims accordingly; or, (2) to devise
a rational approach to the disposition of claims unrelated to the grounds for
divorce. Pursuit of the first alternative logically leads to an equal division of
common property with a set-off for reimbursement and costs of the process
of dissolution. The second alternative points to a rational basis for disposi-
tion of claims under ordinary principles of breach of contract.' 7'
Pursuing the second alternative further, legislative authorization of dissol-
ution of status does not necessarily dispose of rights arising from a breach of
the marital contract. The concepts of dissolution and breach are not neces-
sarily mutually dependent. Indeed, as to the latter, the state is constitution-
ally forbidden to interfere with contractual obligations in general.1 72 Al-
though Texas courts assess damages for breach of contract in a manner
similar to that used for disposition of claims on divorce, the two are not
quite the same. Nor are the consequences always the same even if the
166. In Pennsylvania alimony is awarded only for the support of an insane ex-spouse.
167. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3.
168. For a recent non-Texas case see Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wash. 2d 614, 565 P.2d 94 (1977).
169. If such a limitation is regarded as an implied term on entering into a Texas marriage,
one might look otherwise at the situation. But it has never been suggested that there is such an
implied term. Texas courts have tended to respond coolly to the argument that terms limiting
dissolution are implied in foreign marriages. See Hopkins v. Hopkins, 540 S.W.2d 783 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ); Smitheal v. Smitheal, 518 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928 (1975).
170. It is asserted that a divorce court may make a discretionary choice in granting a divorce
on grounds of fault or no-fault. Clay v. Clay, 550 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1977, no writ).
171. In response to Marvin, Kurtz poses a pointed question: If contractual damages are to be
awarded for the breakdown of a meretricious relationship, why not on the occasion of divorce?
Kurtz, supra note 3, at 122-23.
172. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16.
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standards are similar. A striking difference in consequences arises from the
fact that the division of property is the sole means of disposing of marital
claims. Hence the effectiveness of the remedy is limited by the amount of
property on hand. This approach obviously limits appropriate relief in those
cases when the value of the property will not adequately compensate for the
consequences of breach.
What is suggested as an alternative is not an expansion of the concept of
equitable division of property in the sole discretion of the judge. 173 Rather,
the ordinary principles of breach of contract should be applied, with due
attention to all causes of breach, attempts to avoid breach, and efforts made
to mitigate damages once breach is inevitable. The shift from an equitable
division approach to a more rational breach of contract approach will re-
quire considerable readjustment in judicial analysis. Under the suggested
analysis the spouses' disparity of earning capacity and needs should not be
considered in measuring contractual damages, unless related to the contract
and its breach. On the other hand, the claimant's efforts to avoid breach and
to mitigate the consequences of breach should be considered. Laziness and
helplessness are not acceptable grounds for seeking damages for breach of
contract. In fact, such behavior may be a factor contributing to the breach or
may even be its direct cause. Fault in breach cannot be rewarded. Instead,
fault must be dealt with in reaching a settlement of claims and division of
property just as it is dealt with in resolving other types of breach of contract
and partnership dissolution. Use of a breach of contract analysis to dispose
of marital claims is facilitated by the realization that contracts between
spouses entered into before or during marriage are judicially enforceable. 174
Further, Texas courts have never applied the principle of interspousal
immunity to claims for misapplication of funds during marriage. 175 Since the
Supreme Court of Texas has held that the principle of interspousal immunity
is no longer applicable to intentional torts, 176 the joinder of such damage
claims in divorce cases is likely to hasten acceptance of a breach of contract
analysis in solving all interspousal disputes on dissolution. Moreover, for
some time the award of a money judgment to one spouse in order to equalize
shares in property division has been customary practice. 77 Further, even in
the absence of adequate property to divide, the Dallas court of civil appeals
has approved a money judgment as compensation for culpable dissipation of
marital assets. 178
If there is no community property to be divided, there is no reason in
Texas law why an innocent spouse should not be awarded a money judg-
173. See text accompanying note 163 supra.
174. Claims based on interspousal contracts were sometimes recognized even when married
women suffered under disabilities of coverture. See Ryan v. Ryan, 61 Tex. 473, 474,476 (1884).
At any rate, use of property of one spouse by the other is subject to reimbursement upon
dissolution of the marriage. See also Padgett v. Padgett, 487 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.), commented upon in McKnight, supra note 21, at.454-55.
175. See, e.g., Stramler v. Coe, 15 Tex. 211 (1855); Mahoney v. Snyder, 93 S.W.2d 1219(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, no writ); Coss v. Coss, 207 S.W. 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1918, no writ).
176. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977), overruling the principle ennunciated in
Nickerson & Matson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886). See Note, Abolition of the Interspousal
Immunity in Community Property States, 17 Sw. L.J. 480 (1963).
177. See cases cited in McKnight, supra note 21, at 438 n.151.
178. Reaney v. Reaney, 505 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
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ment for breach of contract. On the other hand, when community assets are
available, they may be divided so that the innocent spouse is given all or a
larger share of them in lieu of a money judgment for breach of contract. If a
preponderance of the evidence does not fix responsibility for breach on
either spouse to the exclusion of the other, the court should leave the parties
where it finds them and divide the community property equally, rather than
equitably. In that situation need and disparity of earning power would be
beside the point.
Although it is contrary to the holding 179 and rationale 80 of Eggemeyer to
award the separate property of one spouse to the other, a money judgment
for breach of contract may be awarded against a spouse who is guilty of
breach and that judgment may be enforced against separate property as in
the case of any other judgment. Such judgments would be no more, and
might possibly be somewhat less, vulnerable to the effects of bankruptcy
discharge than are property divisions on divorce."'1
Appeal. As a general rule, the voluntary acceptance of financial benefits
under a decree dividing property on divorce bars an appeal from the decree.
In Carle v. Carle, 82 however, the Supreme Court of Texas held that when
benefits are accepted under financial duress, appeal is not precluded by
acquiescence.' 83 In the absence of imposition, however, mere possession of
benefits may constitute a bar to appeal within the rule. '8 Consumption of
the benefits of a property division also precludes pursuance of a bill of
review. 185
Disputes After Divorce. Once a couple is divorced, their community prop-
erty becomes a tenancy in common1 6 and the couple's responsibility toward
the property inter se is determined by the ordinary rules governing tenants in
common. In McKean v. Thompson "7 an ex-husband sought to recover from
his former wife expenses attributable to her part of the former community's
share in a joint venture interest. The court rejected the claim for liability
undertaken without the ex-wife's consent. The ex-husband was, however,
entitled to a credit on the books of the venture for his contribution, and he
would be entitled to an allowance for his contribution on distribution of
assets; if the assets should be insufficient to cover liabilities, the risk would
fall on the contributing ex-spouse.
A property settlement recital that the properties mentioned constitute all
the community property is not determinative of whether there is property
179. As to separate realty.
180. As to separate personalty.
181. See text accompanying notes 212-16 infra.
182. 149 Tex. 469, 234 S.W.2d 1002 (1950).
183. See Trevino v. Trevino, 555 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no
writ). See also McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31
Sw. L.J. 105, 111 (1977).
184. Haggard v. Haggard, 550 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ). See also
O'Brien v. Gibbs, 555 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
185. Biggs v. Biggs, 553 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ
dism'd w.o.j.).
186. Martin v. Flener, 543 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Civ. App.'-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
187. 555 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
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left undivided on divorce and hence a tenancy in common to partition
later. 18 Contingent community property undivided on divorce is subject to
partition once the interest has accrued. In Vibrock v. Vibrock,189 which
involved an asserted community property interest in an insurance agent's
renewal commissions unaccrued on divorce, the court did not reach the
issue of partition because a partitionable interest had not been proved.190 But
in Taggart v. Taggart'91 the Supreme Court of Texas determined that contin-
gent community property rights to military retirement benefits left undi-
vided on divorce but since accrued, although not matured, were subject to
partition. 92 In Thibodeaux v. Thibodeaux193 the ex-wife joined the ex-
husband's employer in a suit to partition employee retirement benefits. The
appellate court held that the trial court had properly dismissed the employer
as a party since the ex-wife would be adequately protected by the statute
94
that requires a private employer who has notice of a claim to pay the
claimant even if the employee has already been paid. In contrast, in Collida
v. Collida, 95 a divorce case involving a public retirement fund in which the
trustee indicated that benefits would not be divided between the spouses
unless ordered by the court, the court ordered the trustee as a party to the
suit to make payments directly to the ex-wife.
With respect to federal retirement benefits, courts have generally ordered
the recipient to pay the ex-spouse a share of the benefits as received. In the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals"9 a Texas ex-wife, armed with such an order,
was unsuccessful in her attempt to garnish the Army Finance and Account-
ing Center for her share. She relied on the 1974 federal statute' 97 providing
that "the United States . . . shall be subject . . . to legal process brought
for the enforcement [of] alimony payments." The court rejected her conten-
tion on the ground that the obligation which she sought to enforce could not
be termed "alimony" under Texas law. The El Paso court of civil appeals,
however, has rejected the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit' 98 and interpreted
188. Martin v. Flener, 543 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(proceeding on the death of an ex-spouse). See also Potter v. Potter, 545 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Parr v. White, 543 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 559 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977), noted in
McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 105,130(1977).
189. 549 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 20 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 499 (July 27, 1977).
190. See text accompanying note 52 supra; Hicks v. Hicks,' 546 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1976, no writ). Where a portion of an ex-husband's workmen's compensation
benefits recovered after divorce were sought by the ex-wife, the court held that the burden was
upon the ex-wife to show that the benefits recovered included a community element. See also
Echols v. Austron, Inc., 529 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), with
respect to an ex-spouse's bonus received after divorce.
191. 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1977).
192. In this instance of an incremental acquisition occurring during a period of both single
and marital status, the court determined that the community element in the benefits was
measured by the ratio of the number of months in service while married to the total number of
months in service. Id. at 424.
193. 546 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ).
194. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221(d) (Vernon 1971).
195. 546 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ dism'd).
1%. Marin v. Hatfield, 546 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1977).
197. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (Supp. V 1975); see McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 105, 125 (1977).
198. United States v. Stelter, 553 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ granted).
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"alimony" as any award by a divorce court. 199 If this conclusion is sus-
tained, federal anti-assignment statutes, 200 which have barred enforcement
of awards of federal retirement benefits against the United States, will
finally have been breached. The use of the correlative state anti-assignment
act20 1 as an impediment also appears to have been eliminated in Collida.20
2
During the survey period several cases dealt with post-divorce enforce-
ment2 3 of property settlement and contractual alimony provisions incor-
porated in divorce decrees by agreement. In Vickers v. Vickers2° the agreed
judgment included a provision that one spouse pay the utility bills of the
other as long as the latter should occupy the former family home. The
provision was, of course, enforcible as a contract, 205 and the court had no
difficulty in so treating it. If one ex-spouse seeks to enforce some aspect of a
property settlement agreement, the other is entitled to plead a counterclaim
for breach of other provisions. 21 In Crouch v. Crouch27 an ex-wife sued in
federal court for breach of a separation agreement. The court rejected the
argument that federal courts should abstain from intervention in a domestic
relations proceeding because the action was primarily one for breach of
contract to which the domestic overtones were subsidiary. 2°8 In addition to
the arrears which she sought, the ex-wife was also allowed to recover
damages for anticipatory breach in the value of future payments as a lump
sum.2°9 Although the agreement contained a provision that future incapacity
199. The El Paso court relied on Williams v. Williams, 338 So. 2d 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976), a Florida case involving a Texas divorce decree. The Florida court had relied on a rather
garbled version of In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (5th Cir. 1975), in which the Fifth
Circuit treated an award for reimbursement on divorce as "alimony" for purposes of non-
dischargeability under § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § 35(a)(7) (1970). For a brief
discussion of Nunnally and it's progeny see McKnight, supra note 21, at 476-77.
200. 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1970) and related special statutes, e.g., that barring assignment of a
military serviceman's pay, 37 U.S.C. § 701(c) (1970). See McKnight, Matrimonial Property,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 45-46 (1969).
201. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 6243(e), § 13 (Vernon 1970).
202. 546 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ dism'd). There the pensioners'
trustee sought to rely on Prewitt v. Smith, 528 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no
writ), which was not regarded as controlling. But see Addison v. Addison, 530 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1975), holding a state instrumentality performing governmental
functions is exempt from garnishment for.an award of a divorce court.
203. With respect to enforcement in general see Fullenweider & Feldman, Domestic Rela-
tions Judgments in Texas: Draftsmanship and Enforcibility, 18 S. TEX. L.J. 1 (1977). Two child
support cases supply precedents with respect to contempt that are also applicable in matters of
property. In Ex parte West, 559 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ), the court
held that a new district court which replaces an old domestic relations or juvenile court is the
same court for the purposes of enforcing orders of the old court by contempt. In Ex parte
Oden, 556 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ), however, the court pointed out
that a court to which a matter is transferred under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.05 (Vernon 1975)
has no power to enforce an order of the transferring court by the process of contempt. The most
significant aspect of "continuing jurisdiction" in the suit for divorce, as distinguished from one
affecting the parent-child relationship, is the power of the court to enforce by citation for civil
contempt.
204. 553 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ).
205. Id. at 770. In United States v. Rye, 550 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1977), the court held that a
federal tax lien against the ex-wife might attach to her right to receive support payments from
the ex-husband.
206. Smith v. Carr-Smith, 551 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ).
207. 566 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1978).
208. Id. at 487. See generally McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw.
L.J. 67, 75 (1976).
209. See McKnight, supra note 21, at 413 & n.349. Damages were also awarded for
anticipatory breach in Atkinson v. Atkinson, 560 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977,
no writ), but no point of error was raised as to that issue.
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of the ex-husband would relieve him of future liability, the court considered
this eventuality too speculative to bar recovery. If the petitioning ex-spouse
chooses to rely merely on the prior judgment rather than the settlement
contract, the Amarillo court of civil appeals has invoked, under such facts,
the principle of collateral attack on a judgment to preclude recourse to
extrinsic evidence. 210 If a divorce decree is entered on the basis of an
agreement that a spouse keep a life insurance policy in force in favor of the
children and the insured later changes the beneficiary, the right of the
children is protected in equity. 2
11
Ex-spouses who must satisfy liabilities under property settlements and
divorce decrees continue to seek the relief of discharge in bankruptcy.
Among those debts which are not subject to discharge under section 17 of
the Bankruptcy Act "are those for alimony due or to become due, or for
maintenance or support of a wife.... .,212 Those debts related to property
division are, however, dischargeable. In federal circuits where state adjudi-
cation of property division and grants of alimony are dealt with as distinct
elements in divorce decrees, 213 there is a tendency to draw a sharp line
between the two-discharging the former and protecting the latter. Follow-
ing the approach of the Fifth Circuit, 2 4 lower federalcourts have tended to
find an "alimony substitute" in most cases and have therefore refused to
grant a discharge. 215 This disparity of approach seems to presage resolution
of conflicts by the Supreme Court of the United States. That likelihood
should be heightened by the recent holding of a Rhode Island bankruptcy
court that the bankruptcy bar to discharge is too sexist to pass constitutional
muster. 2
16
IV. MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY
Interspousal gifts. Section 2036 of the Internal Revenue Code provides
that if one spouse makes an inter vivos gift to the other, to the extent that
income from the gift is retained by the donor, that part of the gift is
210. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 560 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
211. Tomlinson v. Lockey, 555 SW.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ);
Roberts v. Roberts, 560 S.W.2d 438 (Tex Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ); Wunsche v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 551 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumount 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); O'Neill v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[list Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
212. Bankruptcy Act § 17(a), I1 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1970).
213. See In re Woods, 561 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1977); Cox v. Cox, 543 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir.
1976); Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1976); Note, Dissolution of Marriage and the
Bankruptcy Act of 1973: "Fresh Start" Forgotten, 52 IND. L.J. 469 (1977). Courts in other
circuits have also wrestled with distinguishing what the divorce courts term a particular award
and what it actually is. See In re Woods, 561 F.2d 27.(7th Cir. 1977). See also In re Smith, 436 F.
Supp. 469 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
214. In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975), discussed in McKnight, supra note 21, at
476; McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 88-89 (1976);
McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 92
(1975). See also In re Smith, 436 F. Supp. 469 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
215. See, e.g., McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 89 &
nn. 154, 155 (1976). The Beaumont court of civil appeals also followed the approach of the Fifth
Circuit. Matthews v. Matthews, No. 8047 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont, Dec. 22, 1977, no writ).
216. In re Wasserman, [1977] 2 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 66.471, discussed in Young, Is
There Alimony After Bankruptcy: The Wasserman Test, 31 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. No. 4,
1977, at 80. See also Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602 (Ist Cir. 1977), declaring the New
Hampshire rape statute unconstitutional.
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includable in the donor's gross taxable estate at death.217 In Revenue Ruling
75-504118 the Treasury took the position that the section was applicable to the
gift by a Texas husband to his wife of his separate property; at least it was
applicable as to half the amount of the gift since, as a general rule, income
generated by separate property is equally shared by the spouses as commu-
nity property. In reaching this conclusion the Service failed to consider the
conclusion of the Supreme Court of Texas in Hutchinson v. Mitchell 219 that
a husband intended that all the income of a trust which he set up for his wife
should be her separate property. The point has been twice reiterated by that
court, once with respect to an outright interspousal gift220 and on another
occasion in a dictum in a case not involving an interspousal situation. 21
Lower courts have reached the same conclusion. 2 2
In the light of its revenue ruling, however, it is not surprising that the
Treasury took the same position in a case before the tax court involving an
interspousal gift of community property. In Castleberry v. Commissioner 23
the husband had made inter vivos gifts to his wife of community securities.
As to half their value the Treasury asserted that these securities were
includable in the husband's estate for estate tax purposes. As a result of the
gift the securities became the separate property of the wife, but since
separate property generates income for the community, one-half the securi-
ties were included in the husband's gross estate. Although it is an accurate
statement of Texas law to say that income of separate property is communi-
ty in most instances, that principle is not necessarily applicable to this
situation. Indeed, if rather than making an outright gift, a donor utilizes the
trust device so that each increment of income may be perceived as a
deferred receipt of the gift, it is easier to conclude that the benefit is
separate property.
Nonetheless, if the gift is in trust, the federal authorities will contend that
what the donee receives is trust income; that is, community property. 24 As
217. I.R.C. § 2036.
218. Rev. Rul. 75-504, 1975-2 C.B. 363.
219. 39 Tex. 488 (1873).
220. Strickland v. Wester, 131 Tex. 23, 112 S.W.2d 1047 (1938).
221. Cauble v. Beaver-Electra Ref. Co., 115 Tex. 1,6, 274 S.W. 120, 121 (1925), decided the
same day as Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925). In Arnold the court did not
discuss the point at issue, but the case is, nevertheless, relied on by the Treasury in reaching its
conclusion in Rev. Rul. 75-504, 1975-2 C.B. 363, and by the Tax Court in Castleberry v.
Commissioner, 68 T.C. 682 (1977).
222. Sullivan v. Skinner, 66 S.W. 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902, writ ref'd); McClelland v.
McClelland, 37 S.W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ ref'd); Monday v. Vance, 32 S.W. 559(Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no writ); Shepflin v. Small, 23 S.W. 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ).
But see In re Long, 542 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ); Mercantile
Nat'l Bank v. Wilson, 279 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Compare Commissioner v. Porter, 148 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 1945), where, in discussing some
of these cases, the court reserved judgment concerning a situation involving a specific trust
provision giving the income to the beneficiary as separate property. Id. at 569. But a dictum in
Commissioner v. Hinds, 180 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1950), aff g II T.C. 314 (1948), nonacquiesced
in, 1949-1 C.B. 5, is in agreement with the position taken in the Texas cases. 180 F.2d at 934.
223. 68 T.C. 682 (1977). See also Commissioner v. Wyly, 69 T.C. No. 17 (1977).
224. Commissioner v. Porter, 148 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1945); Commissioner v. Wilson, 76 F.2d
766 (5th Cir. 1935). See also United States v. Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969); Irwin v. Gavit, 268
U.S. 161 (1925). Neither case involved Texas law and neither is really in point. The issue is not
whether there is taxable federal income but whether the beneficiary of a trust created by
another receives trust income as separate or community property.
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indicated by the Texas Supreme Court in Hutchinson, this conclusion need
not follow. The mere fact that property is received periodically or is shown
to be the income from a fund does not brand it irrefutably as community. To
argue that it is community, it is necessary for the tax authorities to assert
that the trust beneficiary is the owner of an intermediate separate estate
which, as a consequence of the gift, is the source of the income. In the case
of a gift in trust the beneficiary is, therefore, said to own the equitable estate
which produces the income. The fallacy of this line of reasoning is that the
only measure of tangible value of that so-called equitable estate is the
income, the true object of the donor's gift. Depending on the terms of the
trust, the income beneficiary may or may not ultimately receive the trust
corpus, but for the life of the trust the corpus is vested in the trustee and the
beneficiary is periodically receiving deferred donations through the trustee.
The trust income is, therefore, the subject matter of the gift as intended by
the donor. 2
Joint Tenancies. A federal estate tax case involving Louisiana spouses
deals with a problem that has not been before a Texas appellate court since
the enactment of the community property management statute which be-
came effective on January 1, 1968. In Cooper v. United States22 6 a husband
and wife using community funds purchased United States Series E savings
bonds registered in the names of both, with the right of survivorship. The
husband predeceased the wife by fifteen years. It was in respect of her
estate, however, that their children claimed a deduction for their interest
stemming from their father's half-share in the bonds as adjudicated by a
Louisiana court following his death. Relying on Free v. Bland227 the federal
district court denied the children any ownership interest even though one-
half the value of the bonds had been properly included in the deceased
husband's estate. 228 In Free the Texas husband, as sole manager of general
community funds, bought Series E bonds in the joint names of the spouses
with the right of survivorship, but the husband was the survivor.
The immediate Texas background of the law with respect to joint tenan-
cies in federal securities begins with the 1958 case Ricks v. Smith.229 In that
case the Texas Supreme Court upheld the surviving wife's right to federal
savings bonds purchased by the husband in their joint names, with a right of
survivorship, pursuant to federal regulations. The holding rested on the
supremacy of the federal regulations which were a part of the third-party-
beneficiary contract under which the bonds were purchased. 231 In 1961 the
225. This view is well illustrated by Counts, Trust Income-Separate or Community Proper-
ty, 30 TEX. B.J. 851 (1967). Unlike many articles that appeared at the time in that journal, this
was not the by-product of research for a brief in litigation. This article is a quasi-judicial
decision, the conclusion of an arbitrator chosen by both parties to resolve a dispute and to
render an opinion based on conclusions of law.
226. 429 F. Supp. 535 (W.D. La. 1975).
227. 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
228. I.R.C. § 2040.
229. 308 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston), aff'd, 159 Tex. 280, 318 S.W.2d 439
(1958).
230. Although the reference to this third party beneficiary element is extrapolated from the
decision of the lower appellate court, 308 S.W.2d at 946, it seems justified in the light of the
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court considered Hilley v. Hilley23t which concerned corporate stock bought
by the husband in the wife's presence and which were, at his direction,
issued in their joint names with the right of survivorship. The wife survived
and claimed full ownership of the stock. In rejecting this claim the court
repudiated the authority of Ricks, holding that the third-party-beneficiary
contract theory on which Ricks was said to rest was a mere blind for the
survivorship agreement of the spouses; as such, it was regarded as repug-
nant to constitutional and statutory rules governing Texas community prop-
erty law. Six weeks later, when the court again had a federal savings bond
case before it in the Free case itself, 232 the opinion of the court of civil
appeals in favor of the survivor was reversed per curiam. The United States
Supreme Court then granted certiorari and ruled in favor of the Texas
husband who, as sole manager of general community funds, had bought
Series E bonds in the joint names of the spouses, with the right of survivor-
ship. 233 In this instance the husband survived the wife. In a dispute between
the husband and the wife's heir, the Supreme Court sustained the husband's
absolute right to the bonds as survivor on the grounds of federal suprema-
cy. 234 In order to borrow money, the Court said, the federal government
must have unfettered right to contract with lenders in terms of survivorship
in spite of state law which would have precluded such direct conversion of
community property to a joint tenancy, unless "the circumstances manifest
fraud or a breach of trust tantamount thereto on the part of the husband
while acting in his capacity as manager of the general community. ' 235 On
remand the Supreme Court of Texas found no issue of fraud alleged, and,
therefore refused the writ of error, no reversible error. 23 6 In a later case from
the State of Washington,23 7 the Supreme Court of the United States
reiterated that a showing of fraud could preclude the application of the
supremacy doctrine.
Contrary to the dismal prophecy of Justice Walker in Hilley,238 the Texas
constructive fraud doctrine has since matured to the point 239 that the hus-
band's separate taking as survivor under his own contingent community
contract with the United States Treasury would constitute a constructive
fraud on his wife's estate. 240 The fraud exception, therefore, seems to
opening remarks of Hickman, C.J., speaking for the majority of the supreme court, 159 Tex. at
280-81, 318 S.W.2d at 439-40, and those of Walker, J., speaking for the court in Hilley v. Hilley,
161 Tex. 569, 576-77, 342 S.W.2d 565, 569-70 (1961).
231. 161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961).
232. Bland v. Free, 162 Tex. 72, 344 S.W.2d 435 (1961).
233. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
234. Id. at 670.
235. Id.
236. 163 Tex. 594, 359 S.W.2d 297 (1962).
237. Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964).
238. "[Ilt will usually be difficult or impossible to establish actual fraud and we do not
anticipate that constructive fraud will be defined with such clarity as to provide a satisfactory
standard that will insure even reasonably fair treatment to the marital partners and their estates
in various situations that may arise." 161 Tex. at 578, 342 S.W.2d at 571.
239. McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 89 (1976);
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 79-80 (1974).
240. As is suggested in Hilley, the same result should follow with respect to a community life
insurance policy contracted by the husband on the life of the wife with the husband as
beneficiary, old authorities to the contrary notwithstanding. See Martin v. McAllister, 94 Tex.
567, 63 S.W. 124 (1901).
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undermine the applicability of Free to the very facts that gave rise to the
decision. 241 Nevertheless, if the spouse who purchases a federal survivor-
ship bond with community funds is not the ultimate taker, or if both spouses
buy a federal bond together with the right of survivorship, 242 the result of
Free is still applicable since the fraud exception is inapplicable to those
situations. 243 In reaching that conclusion, however, it must be realized that
all the arguments of Hilley and Free would be advanced in the federal
context, very much akin to that of Free, in which the principles of Hilley
have previously triumphed in a non-federal context. Although neither of
those cases has been before a Texas appellate court, Bowman v. Simpson244
presented most of the same arguments and the Supreme Court of Texas
marked it error refused. In Bowman the husband and wife maintained a
federal credit union 245 account in joint names with right of survivorship. On
the husband's death the wife relied on Free in asserting the right to the entire
fund. The Beaumont court of civil appeals rejected this contention on the
ground that the federal statute on joint tenancies was not created to pre-
empt state law but only to place federal credit unions on a par with state
banking institutions. The court reasoned that since the federal government
was not a party to the dispute, its interests were not involved. The strains of
Hilley are replayed with very little variation: "[s]tate law will control in
cases where the litigation is between two private parties and does not intrude
upon the rights and duties of the United States. ,, 24 Thus, judicial reasoning
has come full circle to that prevailing in January 1961 unless a clear distinc-
tion can be drawn between the federal intent in selling bonds and that of
maintaining credit unions. Finally, no Texas case has dealt with the simplest
of federal bond situations, that is, where one spouse has bought a bond in his
or her own name alone. Since the federal Treasury Regulations state, how-
ever, that the named purchaser is "the owner," 247 the principle of Free
seems to apply. On the other hand, this situation can be construed as a
constructive fraud situation where the community would prevail under state
and federal law.
A corollary to a spouse's right to sole management of particular communi-
ty property is the right of the other spouse to claim reimbursement when the
managing spouse's separate estate has been enriched at community ex-
pense. Similarly, if a spouse uses his own or the other spouse's separate
241. In light of Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950), involving a National Service Life
Insurance policy, Roberts v. Roberts, 560 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no
writ), is significant. In Roberts a constructive trust was fixed on the beneficiary of a policy of
life insurance issued by a private company to a federal employee under federal statutory
authority.
242. See, e.g., Cooper v. Texas Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974), where both
spouses acted together to buy land.
243. Considerable conjecture may be entertained with respect to the management and
liability status of such federal bonds both during marriage and after the dissolution of the
marriage by the death of one spouse under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.22, .24, .61 (Vernon
1975) and TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 177(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
244. 546 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd).
245. Organized under 12 U.S.C. § 1751 (1969).
246. 546 S.W.2d at 101. In Hilley, 161 Tex. at 577, 342 S.W.2d at 570, Walker, J., speaking
for the court, asserted that "[T]he Federal regulations do not override our local laws in matters
of purely private ownership where the interests of the United States are not involved."
247. 31 C.F.R. § 315.55 (1976).
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funds for the enhancement of community property, the separate estate is
entitled to reimbursement. 2 4 But no point has been made of those situations
where the statute allows a creditor to recover against the community estate
when as between the spouses liability might more reasonably fall on the
separate estate. Although section 5.62 is provided to allow the other spouse
to make such an argument at the time liability is fixed, the failure to utilize it
may be excusable. If, for example, the husband is sued for commission of an
intentional tort, the wife might interpose the marshalling provision of sec-
tion 5.62 in order to subject the husband's separate property to the judgment
creditor's execution before that of the community. But if the husband at that
time has no separate property, arguing the provisions of section 5.62 would
be useless. If, however, later in the marriage the husband inherits substan-
tial separate property and subsequently dies, the wife should be able to seek
reimbursement from his separate property on dissolution of the community.
On the other hand, if a judgment is taken against one spouse on a joint
obligation when the statute of limitations has run against the other,249 reim-
bursement might be sought by the spouse paying from separate property as
against the community in an appropriate situation. 250 Discharge-of tax liabili-
ty by one spouse for the other may also present an opportunity for the
assertion of a right for reimbursement.
251
Payment by one spouse for liability incurred by the other raises no
implication of gift between them. This is particularly true when liabilities are
discharged in anticipation of marital dissolution by divorce. Disputes have
frequently arisen involving insurance coverage of an estranged spouse for
tortious liability 252 since liability under an insurance policy often turns on
whether the tortfeasor is a member of the household of the insured.
253
Although a right of reimbursement is unlikely to be involved in the subse-
quent division of property, the consequences of such insurance liability may
have a bearing on the equitable division of the community estate.
Credit Liability. In Suniland Furniture Co. v. Liuzza, 254 just prior to their
divorce, a husband and wife were sued by a seller for purchases delivered to
the husband. Judgment was rendered against the husband only. Summary
248. The courts have repeatedly held, however, that the use of separate funds for living
expenses are not reimbursable by the community. See Trevino v. Trevino, 555 S.W.2d 792
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
249. In Roper v. Jeoffrey, 535 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), the statute had run against the husband but had been tolled as against the wife because
she had been out of the state.
250. A claim of reimbursement against the separate property of a decedent's estate might
also be asserted by a surviving spouse when only community property was sought which was
paid to a stranger for tortious liability of a deceased spouse. See Piper v. Estate of Thompson,
546 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
251. For a discussion of some common tax liability problems see Popkin, Deduction of
Traveling Expenses by the Two-Worker Family-An Inquiry into the Role of the Courts in
Interpreting the Federal Tax Law, 55 TEXAS L. REV. 645 (1977).
252. See McCurley, Problems of automobile insurance coverage during separation or di-
vorce, II TRIAL LAW. F. No. 2, at 18 (1976).
253. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kimball, 552 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
254. Suniland Furniture Co. v. Liuzza, No. 8050 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont Dec. 22, 1977,
no writ).
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judgment was rendered in favor of the wife, and as to that judgment the
plaintiff appealed. The plaintiff argued that it was owed a "community
debt" by which both spouses were obligated. In rejecting this contention,
the court relied on the principles of section 5.61 of the Family Code25 5 which
limits liability to property subject to the management of the contracting
spouse. From the brief comments of the court with respect to the facts
offered by the plaintiff to rebut the wife's motion for summary judgment, it
can be surmised that the plaintiff failed to allege the terms of the credit
contract from which implications of mutual agency might have been indi-
cated. All that was shown was that the husband and wife had maintained
what was termed an open account with the merchant. That account was,
therefore, presumably one on which the husband or the wife could make
purchases on credit. More likely it was one by which purchases were billed
to the husband and the wife. No pleadings were addressed to the terms of
the account, and the wife testified that she purchased one item only and paid
for it; all the rest of the purchases were made by the husband and delivered
to him. Consequently, the plaintiff's reliance on Cockerham v.
Cockerham256 was rejected. Nevertheless, Cockerham's relevance to a fully
developed fact situation with respect to the account is obvious.
257
Fraudulent Transfer. From the point of view of a creditor of a particular
spouse, a transfer of property by that spouse to the other in anticipation of
divorce may still be challenged as fraudulent, 258 if the transferee-spouse
knowingly received a preference in respect of another creditor.
Homestead. A divorce court frequently awards occupancy of a homestead
to one spouse or the other for a period of years. If there are no minor
children, or other factors militating in favor of one spouse's occupying the
community homestead to the exclusion of the other, the court may order
sale of the home to achieve a partition. General debts, however, cannot be
ordered discharged from the proceeds of such a sale. 259
In many disputes with creditors, disagreement as to whether a particular
property constitutes a homestead or not is common. 26° The effect of the 1970
increase in urban homestead exemption, has now been fairly well accepted
255. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61 (Vernon 1977).
256. 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975).
257. See Comment, Determining the Liability of Community Property, Cockerham v.
Cockerham, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 608 (1977).
258. In Glasscock v. Citizen's Nat'l Bank, 553 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), the assertion that the interspousal transfer was a property settlement agree-
ment incorporated in the divorce decree was to no avail in rebutting the creditor's claim against
the ex-husband. The principles of Hawes v. Central Texas Prod. Credit Ass'n, 503 S.W.2d 234
(Tex. 1973), are also applicable to such a situation.
259. Delaney v. Delaney, No. 1724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 18, 1978, no
writ).
260. See Comment, Urban or Rural Homestead?, 18 S. TEX. L.J. 145 (1976). In re Abate,
Bk. No. W-76-213 (Bk. Ct. W.D. Tex. June 2, 1977). Inconsequential use for business purposes
cannot sustain claim of business homestead.
With respect to tax exemptions on homestead see TEX. ATrr'Y GEN. Op. Nos. H-1022 (1977),
H-894 (1976). See McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31
Sw. L.J. 130 n.225 (1977).
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as settled. 26' A temporary change of residence does not cause a home to lose
its homestead character. 262 Removal of a family to a new home without any
intention to return to the former residence constitutes an abandonment of
the earlier residence for homestead purposes.2 63 The burden of showing that
the former home is not exempt property is, however, on the creditor. In
contrast, if a homeowner attempts to set aside a conveyance of property on
the ground of non-compliance with the rules of homestead conveyance, the
burden of showing that the conveyed property was a homestead is upon the
party who asserts that fact. 264
That the owner's financial interest in homestead, as distinguished from
any interest in the property owned by another, is a significant factor in
determining the value of exempt urban realty has long been established.
2 61
The same approach would seem to be applicable in computing the value of
exempt personalty. 2 66 That issue, however, probably will not be often en-
countered, except in bankruptcy proceedings. Similarly, an adjudication
with respect to whether business equipment is so "reasonably necessary" as
to be exempt within article 3836(a)(2) will most frequently arise in bankrupt-
cy proceedings. In In re Pratt2 67 the bankruptcy court held that the bankrupt
had not discharged the burden of showing that certain decorative and dup-
licative office furnishings 268 were "reasonably necessary" contrary to the
bankruptcy trustee's report. 269 A bankruptcy court has also concluded that
article 3836(a)(3) means precisely what it says-that only one automobile is
exempt from the claims of creditors. 271
261. In re Bobbit, Bk. No. 3-74-373F (5th Cir. Mar. 9, 1977); Valley Bank v. Skeen, No. 75-
3950 (5th Cir. Apr. 30, 1976); In re Aiken, Bk. Nos. 75-HS-598, 75-HS-599 (Bk. Ct. S.D. Tex.
Apr. 27, 1976); see McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 94-95
(1976).
262. In re Holder, Bk. No. 76-HS-123, 76-HS-124 (Bk. Ct. S.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 1976),
Gonzalez v. Guajardo de Gonzalez, 541 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ). In
Gonzales the court also considered a widow's right to an allowance in lieu of a homestead.
263. Norman v. First Bank & Trust, 557 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.]
1977, no writ).
264. Sims v. Beeson, 545 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For an
instance of a defrauded spouse's assertion of an improper homestead sale see Carter v.
Converse, 550 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Similarly, a showing
of a sham sale was also involved in In re Aiken, Bk. Nos. 75-HS-598, 75-HS-599 (Bk. Ct. S.D.
Tex. Apr. 27, 1976).
265. Kerens Nat'l Bank v. Stockton, 127 Tex. 326, 94 S.W.2d 161 (1936).
266. In Levin v. Mauro, 425 F. Supp. 205 (D. Mass. 1977), the court sidestepped this issue in
applying the Massachusetts exemption statute.
267. Bk. No. 76-H-922 (Bk. Ct. S.D. Tex. July 19, 1977).
268. Several small paintings, scales of justice, statuette of Rodin's Thinker, an elecric heater
and an extra electric typewriter.
269. In In re Neider, Bk. No. 75-HS-1061 (Bk. Ct. S.D. Tex. July 19, 1976), the bankrupt's
claim to office furnishings as "reasonably necessary" was sustained. But in that instance the
claim was directed at items which were neither decorative nor duplicative in nature.
270. In re Perwein, Bk. No. A75-167 (Bk. Ct. W.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 1976), aff'd, (W.D. Tex.
Apr. 28, 1977).
